The Southern African Development Community Tribunal (SADC Tribunal) became operational in 1992 and delivered several judgments against Zimbabwe. Some of those decisions are yet to be enforced. The attempt to enforce them contributed to the demise of the SADC Tribunal. This was due to the existence of various approaches to the reception of community law into domestic law. The tension between community law and domestic law, international law and domestic law, and community law and international law is as old as the hills. The monist and dualist theories of international law assist in attempting to clarify the nature of the relationship between international law and municipal law, but there is no guidance when it comes to community law and national law. This paper will explore how the SADC Community law can be applied uniformly by South Africa, Zimbabwe and all other SADC member states. This will be done by looking at decided cases with specific reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe. In order to establish the best practices in other jurisdictions, reference will be made to the East African Court of Justice, the European Union (EU) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The discourse will conclude by advocating the adoption of a revised Protocol on the SADC Tribunal in order to clarify the nature of the relationship between the SADC Community law and the domestic laws of SADC member states.
Introduction
The SADC Tribunal is one of Africa's sub-regional courts established in terms of article 9(g) as read with article 16 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (the SADC Treaty). The mandate of the SADC Tribunal was inter alia to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, including adjudicating over disputes that might be referred to it. 1 The inauguration of the SADC Tribunal and the swearing in of its staff took place on 18 November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia, where the Tribunal is situated. 2 The Tribunal became operational on 22 November 2006. It was suspended in August 2010 by the SADC Heads of State and Government. 3 The decisions of the suspended Tribunal were supposed to be final and binding on the parties in dispute. 4 However, most of its decisions were never implemented. 5 Instead, on 18 August 2014 the Summit adopted and signed the 2014 Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community (2014 Protocol) at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe. 6 The 2014 Protocol limits the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal to disputes relating to those between member states only. 7 The Zimbabwean and South African courts currently adopt different approaches to recognise and enforce the decisions of the SADC Tribunal. For example, in the matter between Gramara (Pvt) Ltd v The Government R PHOOKO PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 3
of Zimbabwe 8 the applicants unsuccessfully attempted to register and enforce a judgment of the SADC Tribunal in the domestic court of Zimbabwe. However, the South African courts recognised and enforced the Tribunal's aforementioned decision. 9 In both these cases, the applicants had sought the courts of South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively to directly apply undomesticated provisions of the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal in their jurisdictions. This application was made in order to bring about the recognition and enforcement of the decisions of the SADC Tribunal. These different judgments highlighted the tension between the SADC Community law and domestic law when enforcing decisions of sub-regional courts that uphold states' regional obligations. 10 There is currently no provision in the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal that deals with the nature of the relationship between international law and the national law of member states. Furthermore, the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal fail to regulate the relationship between community (SADC) law and the domestic law of member states, or the relationship between the community itself and international law. The clarification of these relationships is important in order to "make community law effective in national legal systems". 11 As a result of the existence of this gap in the SADC Treaty, one needs to consider the provisions of the member states' national constitutions in this instance together with the approach taken by national courts in dealing with the 8
Gramara (Private) Limited v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe HC 33/09
(hereafter the Gramara case).
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States in this regard follow either the monism or the dualism theories of law. The former means that international law becomes applicable in domestic law upon ratification. In other words, the monism theory views international law and domestic law as one legal system. In the latter model international law and domestic law are regarded as two distinct legal systems. Therefore, ratified international treaties still need to be incorporated into domestic law before they can have the force of national law. For a detailed discussion on the monism and dualism theories of international law, see inter alia lacuna. 12 To this end, the monist-dualist debate is useful, as it provides answers as to how domestic legal systems should incorporate treaty law. 13 In order to understand the relationship between the SADC Community law and national law, this discourse will look into the status of the SADC Community law in South Africa and Zimbabwe. In cases where the constitution of either of the countries does not provide a solution, there is a need to clarify the relationship between the SADC Community law and national law in order to prevent legal uncertainty. This is so because presently there is uncertainty as to which system is applicable when a conflict arises between the SADC Community law and national laws of SADC member states. Hence, in order to ensure that the status of the SADC Community law in national laws is clearly defined and given effect to, it is imperative that these deficiencies be resolved.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between the SADC Community law and the national law of member states; the relationship between international law and the national law of member states; and the relationship between the SADC Community law and international law, with specific reference to South Africa and Zimbabwe. The argument presented in this discussion is that there is a need for a uniform application of the SADC Community law in South Africa and Zimbabwe for the proper functioning of the SADC Community, the SADC Community law and the future SADC Tribunal. Further, the paper will discuss the traditional theories on the reception of international law in national law to ascertain whether these can provide guidance on the nature of the relationship between the SADC Community law and national law. In order to search for answers, the paper will also study the national constitutions 14 of South Africa and Zimbabwe, the law and legal instruments applicable to the SADC Tribunal, and the approach taken by the national courts of South Africa and Zimbabwe in giving SADC Community law the force of domestic law. In order to establish the best practices in other jurisdictions, the paper will make reference to the treaties and decided cases establishing the East African Court of Justice and the ECJ. This is because states are sovereign and, for the "intrusion" of foreign laws into their legal systems to be accommodated, the sovereign's imprimatur is necessary. 15 The legal systems of South Africa and Zimbabwe are similar in that they are both dualist in nature since the two countries are former British colonies. 16 In terms of the dualist theory, international law may be applied by national courts only if it has been transformed into national law through legislation. 17 In other words, international law and national law are viewed as two distinct separate legal systems.
However, the monist theory views international law and domestic law as a single system of law. 18 Consequently, international law need not be incorporated into national law, because the act of ratification (followed by the publication) of an international treaty immediately transforms the treaty law into national law. 19 Unlike the situation in the dualist model, upon its ratification and publication the treaty obtains the force of national law, and its status in local law is settled in that international law takes precedence over national law. 20 This means that international law is applicable as law in the national legal system and may be invoked directly before the national courts. 21 However, it must be noted that this is not automatically the position in all countries whose legal systems are monist. The precedence of international law over national law largely depends on how the constitution of a particular country determines the status of international law. Therefore, the fact that international law may be directly applied by the courts, does not mean that it automatically takes precedence over domestic law.
There is an observation that can be made about the traditional theories on the reception of international law in national law. international law and municipal law, there is no clarity about which law should prevail unless a specific country has expressly indicated so in its constitution (e.g. that the national legal system shall have the same status as international law, or that the latter shall enjoy superior status where a conflict between the two legal systems arises). Tshosa has observed that the monist and dualist theories must be "approached with caution" as they may not "in practical terms purely determine the relationship between national and international law". 22 The South African jurisprudence, as will be shown later, supports Tshosa's assertion. He further submits that the applicability of international law in the national sphere is "always conditioned by a rule of municipal law". In addition, the application of treaties in many legal systems is mainly "governed by domestic constitutional law". 23 Further, Tshosa points out that the practical approach of the national courts is different as at times even monist countries fail to apply treaties that are applicable in a particular case. 24 Despite these observations, Tshosa agrees that both theories on the reception of international law into domestic law are useful in helping to understand the relationship between international law and municipal law. Indeed, despite the obvious gaps in the monist and dualist theories, they are nonetheless valuable in identifying how a particular legal system treats international law within its national law. Thosa's views have merit and it is submitted that they should also apply to regional law, because community law and international law are created through state consent and member states decide the manner in which these two legal systems will be given the force of law in their own territories. 25 Further, as Barents correctly points out, "there is no fundamental difference between community law and international law, as various characteristics of the community legal order such as direct effect … [and] primacy are also recognised in international law". 26 I concur with Barents' sentiments because, in reality, international law and community law (such as the SADC Community law, the East African Community Law and the European Community law) are adopted and operationalised in the same manner. Even though the latter laws operate in different spheres, their characteristics are to a large extent similar to those of international law. Therefore, one could argue that community law could also be regarded as international law. example, community law is also created through state consent and regulates relations inter alia among member states for the common good. To this end, it is submitted that community law should be treated as international law when it comes to domestic law. Gramara case para 9.
The decision of the Zimbabwean court
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Gramara case para 12. or treaties in force…". 41 To this end, this international law principle is applicable in this case because community law should be treated as international law when it comes to domestic law. 42 The basis for this proposition is that both community law and international law systems are created through state consent and therefore have similar characteristics. Therefore, it is submitted that the High Court of Zimbabwe ought to have applied this principle of international law, as its domestic laws contradicted the provisions of the SADC Treaty.
The High Court further noted that the repercussions of the Tribunal's decisions would affect not only those who were applicants before the SADC Tribunal but would also extend to all those whose land had been expropriated by the government since 2000. In other words, the government would be required inter alia to return the land of all the people affected from the year 2000. Finally, Patel J said:
As for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the applicants before the Tribunal and others in their position are absolutely correct in expecting the Government of Zimbabwe to comply with its obligations under the SADC Treaty and to implement the decisions of the Tribunal. However, I take it that there is an incomparably greater number of Zimbabweans who share the legitimate expectation that the Government will effectively implement the land reform programme and fulfil their aspirations thereunder. Given these countervailing expectations, public policy as informed by basic utilitarian precept would dictate that the greater public good must prevail. In the result, having regard to the foregoing considerations and the overwhelmingly negative impact of the Tribunal's decision on domestic law and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe, and notwithstanding the international obligations of the Government, I am amply satisfied that the registration and consequent enforcement of that judgment would be fundamentally contrary to the public policy of this country. 43 Hansungule has in my view correctly noted with concern that these words "raise controversial questions". 44 The judge seems to be indicating that even though Zimbabwe has not taken any measures to incorporate the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal in its domestic laws, it cannot rely on its domestic laws to evade international obligations. As a result, Zimbabwe has a duty to carry out its treaty obligations in good faith. However, despite these positive observations from the learned judge, he indicated that recognising the decision of the SADC Tribunal in Zimbabwe would be contrary to public policy as the enforcement would reverse a constitutionally approved land See page 6 para 1 of this discourse.
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R PHOOKO PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 10 reform programme. Furthermore, emphasis was placed on the fact that land acquisition by the government commenced in 2000 and as such there were practical consequences for implementing the decision as it would affect everyone whose land had been expropriated without compensation. This raises a number of questions such as the following: does it mean that if the land reform programme were in its early stages of implementation and none of the land had already been taken by the government, the High Court would have recognised and enforced the aforesaid decision? The reasoning of the Court is somehow contradictory in various respects. This is evident as the Court seemed to be placing more emphasis on international obligations but eventually applied national law. In addition, the Court said that international law and domestic law are distinct and enjoy supremacy in their respective domains. Therefore, neither law enjoys supremacy over the other. This dilemma is what this analysis seeks to resolve. It is submitted that the court failed to properly articulate its position in considering established principles of international law when there is a conflict between domestic and international law. Further, that the Court's observation is incorrect to the extent that although national constitutions contain clauses indicating that they prevail over all domestic laws, such clauses cannot be applied if such an application allows member states to evade their international obligations. 45 Therefore, this decision is a clear case of international law being disregarded on the grounds that it is contrary to the domestic law that sanctioned the expropriation of land without compensation. It further shows that there is a conflict between two legal systems that are said to be independent in their own spheres and have no possibility of unification, at least in this case.
The decision of the South African court
South Africa follows a dualistic approach. This means that treaties are not directly enforceable in the domestic sphere unless parliament gives such treaty law the force of national law under section 231 (4) Schlemmer asserts that the WTO agreements are binding on South Africa only at an international level because they have been ratified. 48 However, since the provisions of the WTO treaties have not yet been incorporated into national law through an act of parliament, they are not part of South African national law. 49 The statutory enactment of international law in domestic law is the final step in the procedure triggering the applicability of international law in national law. In this regard I align myself with Schlemmer because South Africa is a dualist state. For dualist states, the assumption of treaty obligations at an international level which require to be applied in the national sphere is not completed by the act of ratification alone. 50 There is an additional requirement, which is to transfer that particular treaty obligation through legislation in the domestic legal system. 51 their constitutions require them to do so. Therefore, this obliges these two countries to take all the necessary measures to give effect to the Tribunal's judgments. It is interesting to note the court's proactive role in applying undomesticated treaty law in South Africa without even venturing into the dualist nature of the South African legal system. This approach is acknowledged by a scholar who correctly points to the court's failure to refer to traditional theories of the reception of international law into national law as follows:
The Court unfortunately did not say anything about the dualistic nature of the South African legal system especially with regard to the incorporation of international law into domestic law. Instead, it merely said that Parliament had approved the SADC Treaty. This could be read as implying that international obligations are automatically binding in South Africa without the need for incorporation. 59 The author submits that the court ought to have fully elaborated on this crucial aspect as it has implications for the relationship between the SADC community law and national law. To this end, the court was expected at least to rely and/or mention the provisos of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 60 that the consent of the state to be bound by a treaty shall be effective, 61 that "[e]very treaty in force is binding on the parties to it", 62 and that a party may not rely on its internal laws to evade its international obligations. 63 It is further submitted that the court failed to properly interpret and apply the dualist theory, which requires international law to be incorporated through national legislation in order for it to bind South Africa at a domestic level. The court incorrectly applied an undomesticated law and by doing so departed from its own jurisprudence, which had clarified the status of international law (the SADC Community law) in South Africa. It could be argued that by doing so the court adopted a monist approach, which does not comply with the provisions of section 231 of the Constitution that deal with the incorporation of treaty law into the South African jurisdiction. "South Africa has essentially bound itself to do whatever is legally permissible" to ensure that the authority of the Tribunal is respected without relying on any legal authority leaves more questions unanswered than answers given. 65 The court's reasoning, which essentially "gives unincorporated treaties the force of national law, is problematic, as it is contrary to section 231(4) of the Constitution of South Africa, which deals specifically with treaty law". 66 It is submitted that this means that the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal are directly applicable in South Africa without the need for further incorporation in South Africa's national law. The Courts' following of a monist approach has the potential to create legal uncertainty, something that is undesirable for relationship between South Africa's domestic law with the SADC Community law and/or international law. The effect of this decision is that undomesticated SADC Community law and/or international law has the force of law in South Africa. Furthermore, future litigants may directly invoke the provisions of undomesticated treaty law before the national courts.
General observations from the South African and Zimbabwean cases
The first observation that can be drawn from the above discussion is that although South Africa's and Zimbabwe's legal systems are dualist in nature, the courts of these two countries arrived at different conclusions when dealing with a case that involved the enforcement of an undomesticated treaty law in the domestic domain. In this instance, the Zimbabwean court declined to register and enforce a judgement of the SADC Tribunal, while a South African court registered and enforced the decision.
A further observation is that the South African court placed more emphasis on the commitments of SADC member states to honour their treaty obligations by enforcing a decision of the SADC Tribunal. Given the fact that this matter was adjudicated in the South African courts, one would have expected the Constitutional Court to rule in favour of Zimbabwe, because "Constitutional supremacy is also regarded as sacrosanct". 67 The court ought to have adopted the dualist approach and dismissed the application. The basis for this is that SADC Community law, international law and domestic law are distinct and regarded as supreme in their own spheres of
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Phooko SADC Tribunal 132. (21) 15 operation. 68 The only acceptable departure from the dualist approach is the application of a constitutionally approved noncompliance.
In addition, the High Court of Zimbabwe noted that Zimbabwe had not taken any measures to transform the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal into its domestic laws. 69 Therefore, the court placed more emphasis on the Constitution of Zimbabwe and ruled that for reasons that included public policy and the supremacy of the Constitution, it was unable to register and enforce the SADC Tribunal's decision. The Zimbabwean Court was to a large extent correct in declining to directly apply the provisions of the SADC Treaty and SADC Protocol on the Tribunal as they did not have the force of local law. However, it is also possible for one to argue that the decision was incorrect because in terms of international law, a state may not rely on its domestic laws to evade its SADC Community law and/or international law obligations. 70 The fact of the matter is that if a constitution of a particular country provides for a procedure for the domestication of international law in the local sphere, such a procedure should be adhered to.
Finally, and more controversially, as both countries have legal systems that are dualist in nature, one would have expected the courts of these countries to dismiss the cases and give the legislatures an opportunity to align their local laws with the SADC Community law obligations. The Zimbabwean courts should have given the legislature an opportunity to align its local laws with her SADC Community law obligations, including an opportunity to incorporate the SADC Community law into the domestic laws of Zimbabwe. Whether or not this would have happened had the court provided such an opportunity is something that can only be speculation at this moment in time. South African courts should have given the legislature an opportunity to incorporate the SADC Community law obligations into municipal law. The writer is also mindful of the doctrine of separation of powers in all these instances. In fact, it appears that the South African court to a large extent usurped the powers of the legislature when it applied undomesticated treaties in the South African jurisdiction. It is submitted that the emergence of these different decisions from the two jurisdictions has caused further The emergence of regional organisations such as the EU has created an additional sphere of law that is known as community law. This is an area of law that is additional to the already existing international law and national law systems. In my view, there are therefore three spheres of laws in this regard, namely international law, community law and national law. These laws are unique, operate in different spheres, and are supreme in their own domains. This presents a difficulty when, for example, domestic courts have to apply the SADC Community law in their own spheres.
As there are three spheres of laws that I have identified above, this entails that there exist three relationships in these areas of law, namely:
 the relationship between community law and the domestic laws of member states, that is sometimes defined in the constitutive documents of regional or sub-regional organizations; 71  the relationship between international law and the domestic law of member states; and  the relationship between community law and international law. 72 I have already indicated earlier that community law and international law should be treated the same because inter alia they are adopted and operationalized in the same manner.
However, these relationships are often not determined in constitutions of the countries concerned and/or in international and community laws. It is submitted that due to factors such as globalisation and regional integration, these relationships should be clarified by states in their national constitutions and/or the treaties that they have concluded, as this would be significant for legal certainty. 71 Oppong "Making Regional Economic Community Laws Enforceable" 2.
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The term "SADC Community law" refers to legal principles and undertakings that are contained in the SADC Treaty and its protocols. 73 It must be noted that regulations and other treaties of the community also form part of community law. 74 In accordance with the EU system in which community law is regarded as a separate legal order which inter alia takes precedence over the conflicting laws of member states, 92 three key arguments are advanced to justify the supremacy of community (regional) law over the national law of member states. These are:
 the international legal obligation to observe treaties;  ensuring the efficacy and uniform application of community law; and  the autonomous character of the community legal order (this is not applicable in the current SADC legal system). 93 These arguments are supported as they justify the supremacy of community law over national law. Another noticeable feature of the EU system is the autonomous character of the EU community law, which makes community law supreme over the laws of member states. 94 It is submitted that these characteristics should also apply in the SADC region and the SADC Community law because it would be a futile exercise for SADC member states to embark on a lengthy and expensive process of negotiating and adopting treaties whose provisions would thereafter be ignored. It is nonetheless conceded that community law, just like international law, is largely based on state consent. Therefore, states may negotiate and thereafter opt to be part of a treaty, decide to make reservations on certain provisions, or choose not to be a party to such a treaty. Notwithstanding, when it is clear that the SADC Community law takes precedence over the national law of member states, there will be legal certainty. This will also 88 Cassese Realizing Utopia 88.
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The Fick CC case. prevent a situation whereby national law and the SADC Community law regulate similar issues differently. 95 In addition, it is submitted that for the better effectiveness of SADC Community law, SADC states should accept that by becoming state parties to the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal, they have ceded certain portion of their sovereignty to the SADC Community legal order. Accordingly, they are bound to observe and respect the community legal order.
The jurisprudence of the ECJ also warrants a discussion, as it has been very useful in clarifying the relationship between community law and the national law of EU member states. 96 Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss the concept of direct application as developed by the ECJ. Direct application means that community law does not require the legislature to enact any legislation in order to make EU law applicable in member states. Immediately on coming into operation, community law is binding and applicable in EU member states. 97 The ECJ has correctly stated that the operation of community law is "… independent of any measure of reception into national law …" and that member states are under an obligation to respect the direct applicability of community law. 98 In the event of a conflict between the EU law and the national law of member states, community law will prevail. 99 This was affirmed in the matter Flaminio Costa v ENEL:
[B]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from limitation of sovereignty or transfer of powers from the States to the 95 See for example Gramara case. In this case the applicants sought to register and enforce a judgment of the SADC Tribunal in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean Constitution authorises the expropriation of land without compensation. As a result, the applicants were evicted from their farms and their farms were expropriated. They then went to the SADC Tribunal to challenge the constitutionality of the land reform programme. The SADC Tribunal ruled in their favour and inter alia ordered that Zimbabwe pay a fair compensation to the applicants. The SADC Tribunal had ruled that Zimbabwe was in breach of its obligations inter alia to act in accordance with human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principle of non-discrimination. The High Court of Zimbabwe declined to honour the judgment of the SADC Tribunal because it was contrary to public policy as it sought to annul a constitutionally mandated land reform programme. On the one hand Zimbabwe has its own domestic laws, which sanction the expropriation of white famers' lands without compensation. On the other hand, the SADC has its own laws, such as human rights (which include a right to be compensated in cases of expropriation), which require Zimbabwe to respect and not to discriminate. The SADC law protects the rights of people not to be evicted from their homes. The ECJ's decision in the aforesaid case basically means that the EU law, as regards order of precedence, enjoys a status superior to that of the laws of the member states. 101 The doctrine of supremacy has been the main driving force in achieving European integration. 102 As a result, it has been said that the ECJ has gone beyond its interpretative role and entered into the realm of policy-making. 103 The idea of the supremacy of EU law is not mentioned in any of the EU Treaties but was developed by the ECJ through its jurisprudence. Direct applicability does not mean the same thing as direct effect. The latter pertains to when an individual may invoke community law in a case before a national court and that court will be bound to follow the community law. 104 The approach taken by the ECJ is commended, as the community legal order has to be effective and provide protection when community law is threatened. Indeed, the ECJ is tasked with the responsibility of interpreting the community law and is the backbone of the community legal order. It is an integral part of the EU legal order.
The Treaty Establishing the East African Community may also provide guidance on the relationship between community law and the national law of member states of SADC countries (such as South Africa and Zimbabwe). This treaty specifically provides that "[c]ommunity … laws shall take precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty". 105 There is no doubt that this provision clearly defines the nature of the relationship between the East African Community law and the national law of member states. Community law is superior to the national law of member states. The drafters of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community presumably foresaw the need for this provision to prevent a situation in which community law would be challenged on the basis of its incompatibility with the national law of member states. In addition, with regard to the relationship between community law and national law, it is clear that the position in the East African Community is similar to that in EU community law. The only difference is that the relationship between community law and national law in the former is contained in the Treaty establishing the East African Community, whereas the relationship in the latter community was developed by the ECJ. The SADC Treaty does not provide clear guidance on this critical issue.
The possibility that the future SADC Tribunal could decide that the SADC Community law has direct effect in the national courts of member states cannot be ruled out. It is submitted that there is also a probability that in time, as happened with the EU community legal order, the SADC Tribunal could develop a jurisprudence in terms of which the SADC Community law enjoys precedence over the national laws of member states. It is conceded, however, that it is most unlikely that African states will easily accept the direct applicability of the SADC Community law. This is especially the case since the relationship between the SADC Community law and domestic law is not clear. supreme, such conduct is regarded as that of the state. Accordingly, national laws need to be in line with the nation's international law obligations, and the state must modify its laws accordingly. 108 Acknowledging the good practice of the EU community, where community law is superior to the national law of member states, it is submitted that that this should also be followed in the SADC legal order. The views of Kwiecien relating to the principle of the supremacy of the SADC Community law over the national law of member states are supported. These views are that such supremacy:
 prevents national agencies from challenging the validity of community law;  prohibits states or organs of state from applying national law that is incompatible with the provisions of community law;
 prohibits states or organs of state from enacting laws that are contrary to community provisions; and  imposes obligations on member states to amend their national laws that conflict with contrary provisions in community law.
The above principles are important as they ensure that the SADC Community law has a uniform meaning and effect in the national legal systems of member states. 109 In the SADC context, where such supremacy would prevent a situation in which courts interpret and apply the SADC Community law differently, as was the case with South Africa and Zimbabwe. It is submitted that leaving the reception of the SADC Community law in national law to the discretion and mercy of South Africa and Zimbabwe would negatively affect the functioning of the future SADC Tribunal and the SADC community as whole. The rationale for making this statement is that the SADC Community law would be subject to the national laws of the aforesaid countries. 110 Upon ratification, the SADC Community law should have an impact on the local legal system of member states. The basis for this submission is to prevent a situation where community law would be applied where it suits member states. This discussion has revealed that South Africa and Zimbabwe have not taken measures to give effect to the provisions of the SADC Treaty or the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal in their national laws. Oppong muses on the negative attitude of the non-incorporation of ratified treaties as follows:
[T]he fact of unincorporation may be a manifestation of parliamentary resistance to the treaty. By giving effect to it absent a national implementing measure, the judiciary may be indirectly setting itself up against the will of an elected branch of government or upsetting the balance of power between the various organs of government. 113
The aforesaid position arose in Gramara (Pvt) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe 114 where the Zimbabwean court observed that it was common cause between the parties that the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal were not domesticated in Zimbabwe and therefore inapplicable. Zimbabwe has not been friendly towards the reception of international law in its domestic laws. It still strongly relies on state sovereignty and/or the supremacy of its own laws as the justification for "non-compliance with certain or all rules of international law". 115
The proposed autonomy and supremacy of the SADC Community law will address issues such as those that were confronted by the Zimbabwean and South African courts. In contradistinction, as we saw above, the South African Constitutional Court recognised and registered the SADC Tribunal's decision even though the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal had not been domesticated in South Africa. 116 In this light, there is a need to adopt the approach of the EU community legal order, to give guidance on the application of the SADC Community law so that the latter has a direct effect and is directly applicable in South Africa, Zimbabwe and other SADC member states. 
3.
Article 3: Autonomous legal order and supra-nationality
(1) The SADC Community legal system is an autonomous legal order.
(2) The SADC Community legal system is superior to the legal systems of member states and in case of irreconcilable differences, the SADC Community law shall take precedence over conflicting provisions in the national systems of member states.
4.
Article 4: Applicability of the SADC Community law in member states
(1) Member states, individuals and NGOs shall have access to the Tribunal and may invoke the provisions of the SADC Community law directly before the domestic courts of their national states, and domestic courts are obliged to consider and apply community law.
The aforesaid proposed provisions will obviously have an impact on the state sovereignty of all SADC member states. Sovereignty is something that has always been a politically sensitive issue for many African states due to their colonial history. Although political considerations may be an obstacle to realising the above recommendations, it is submitted that in the interest of regionalism, economic integration, the rule of law, democracy and human rights, SADC Heads of State or Government should seriously consider these proposals. The success and proper functioning of the future SADC Tribunal will depend on the political will of all SADC members. It must also be emphasised that "the creation of the SADC regional order presupposes that states intended to create an authority superior to those of national law". 117 If such an authority is not respected, the relevance of the SADC Community law will be non-existent.
Conclusion
This paper has revealed that South Africa and Zimbabwe have not domesticated the provisions of the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal in their domestic laws. Even though this is the case, the South African court registered and enforced a decision of the SADC Tribunal. Zimbabwe declined to register the decision of the SADC Tribunal. Learning from other jurisdiction such as the East African Community, the EU and the ECJ, the paper discovered that the aforesaid institutions played a pivotal role in ensuring that community law is superior to domestic laws. In other instances such as the East African Community the drafters of the Treaty establishing the East African Community clearly spelt out the nature of the relationship between the laws of the East African Community and the laws of member states. Therefore, it is important for SADC to learn from the aforesaid jurisdictions for the proper functioning of the SADC Community law and legal certainty. The courts also play a major role in enforcing the SADC Community law as seen in the South African case. Ultimately, for the purposes of the effective functioning of the SADC, the SADC Community law and the SADC Tribunal, SADC member states should consider making the SADC Community law superior to the national laws of member states.
In the event of a conflict between the SADC Community law and the national law, the former should prevail. It must be mentioned that all these recommendations are to a large extent dependent on the political will of the SADC member states.
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